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In current electronic commerce systems, customers have an on-line interaction with mer-
chants via a browser on their personal computer. Also payment is done electronically
via the Internet, mostly with a credit card. In parallel to this, e-services via wireless-
only systems are emerging. This paper identifies security and functionality weaknesses
in both of these current approaches. The paper discusses why and how general-purpose
mobile devices could be used as an extension to PC based systems, to provide more se-
curity and functionality. General-purpose mobile devices are shown to be an alternative
to costly special-purpose hardware. This combined approach has in many cases more
interesting properties than when using mobile devices only. As an example of the com-
bined approach, a GSM based electronic payment system is proposed and investigated.
The system enables users to order goods through the World Wide Web and pay by using
their mobile phone.
1 Introduction
In current electronic commerce systems, cus-
tomers have an on-line interaction with merchants
via a browser on their personal computer. Also
payment is done electronically via the Internet,
mostly by sending a credit card number to the
merchant. This basic system is in widespread use
today, and most people are familiar with buying
books and music, booking flights, ordering PCs,
etc. There are however some important security
problems. For example, credit card numbers are
often stolen by hackers from merchants’ comput-
ers, orders and confirmations are usually not digi-
tally signed and can be repudiated afterwards. In
parallel to the fixed PC based systems, e-services
are also emerging in the wireless world. Current
mobile devices have however rather limited func-
tionality, and in many applications, they are not
suited to be used on their own.
This paper suggests a combined approach in
which mobile devices are used as an extension to
the World Wide Web environment. The paper
starts with a description of the security properties
of the World Wide Web in Sect. 2, and the secu-
rity features in some wireless systems, i.e., GSM
and WAP, in Sect. 3. Section 4 discusses secu-
rity and functionality weaknesses in both worlds,
and suggests a combined approach. An example
of this approach is given in Sect. 5: a GSM based
electronic payment system for the WWW is pro-
posed and investigated. Further analysis of this
system is presented in Sect. 6.
2 World Wide Web security
There are many security issues related to the
WWW. Within the scope of this paper, we will
only discuss the communications security aspect,
both at the network and the application level, and
the payment security aspect.
2.1 Communications security
The communication between a web browser and
a web server is secured by the SSL/TLS protocol.
Historically, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) was an
initiative of Netscape Communications. SSL 2.0
contains a number of security flaws which are
solved in SSL 3.0. SSL 3.0 was adopted by the
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IETF Transport Layer Security (TLS) working
group, which made some small improvements and
published the TLS 1.0 [9] standard. “SSL/TLS”
is used in this paper, as “SSL” is an acronym ev-
eryone is quite familiar with; however, the use of
TLS in applications is certainly preferred to the
use of the SSL protocols.
Within the protocol stack, SSL/TLS is situ-
ated underneath the application layer. It can
in principle be used to secure the communica-
tion of any application, and not only between a
web browser and server. SSL/TLS provides en-
tity authentication, data authentication, and data
confidentiality. In short, SSL/TLS works as fol-
lows: public-key cryptography is used to authen-
ticate the participating entities, and to establish
cryptographic keys; symmetric key cryptography
is used for encrypting the communication and
adding Message Authentication Codes (MACs),
to provide data confidentiality and data authen-
tication respectively. Thus, SSL/TLS depends on
a Public Key Infrastructure. Participating enti-
ties (usually only the server) should have a pub-
lic/private key pair and a certificate. Root cer-
tificates (the certification authorities’ certificates
that are needed to verify the entities’ certificates)
should be securely distributed in advance (e.g.,
they are shipped with the browsers). Private keys
should be properly protected. Note that these two
elements, i.e., distribution of root certificates in
browsers and the protection of private keys, is ac-
tually one of the weak and exploited points with
respect to WWW security (see 4.1).
More detailed information on SSL/TLS, the se-
curity flaws in SSL 2.0, and the differences be-
tween SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, can be found in
Rescorla [30].
2.2 Application security
SSL/TLS only protects data while it is in tran-
sit. Moreover, exchanged messages are not digi-
tally signed. Therefore it does not provide non-
repudiation. Both customers and merchants can
always deny later on having sent or received re-
quests or confirmations from each other.
In addition to SSL/TLS, critical messages
should thus be digitally signed before they are
sent through the secure channel. The concept of
digitally signing messages is not really integrated
yet in today’s web browsers. Netscape though al-
lows the content of forms to be digitally signed
using the Javascript signText() function. XML
will be more and more used on the WWW to rep-
resent content instead of the basic HTML. In the
future, browsers are therefore expected to imple-
ment Signed XML [11], which specifies how XML
documents should be digitally signed.
Note that an alternative protocol to secure the
communication on the WWW has been proposed
in the past: S-HTTP [31]. This protocol is sit-
uated at the application layer, and is specifically
intended for HTTP. It secures HTTP messages
in a very similar way to the protocols for secure
email, and provides non-repudiation. SSL/TLS
has however become the de-facto standard on the
web, and S-HTTP was not a success.
2.3 Payment security
Although numerous different electronic payment
systems have been proposed that can be or are
used on the WWW, including micro-payment sys-
tems and cash-like systems, most transactions on
the web are paid using credit cards. Mostly, cus-
tomers just have to send their credit card number
to the merchant’s web server. This is normally
done ‘securely’ over SSL/TLS, but some serious
problems can still be identified. Users have to
disclose their credit card number to each mer-
chant. This is quite contradictory to the fact that
the credit card number is actually the secret on
which the whole payment system is based (note
that there is no electronic equivalent of the addi-
tional security mechanisms present in real world
credit card transactions, such as face-to-face in-
teraction, physical cards and handwritten signa-
tures). Even if the merchant is trusted and hon-
est this is risky, as one can obtain huge lists of
credit card numbers by hacking into (trustwor-
thy, but less protected) merchants’ web servers.
Moreover, it is possible to generate fake but valid
credit card numbers, which is of great concern for
the on-line merchants. Thus, merchants bear risk
in card-not-present transactions.
Secure Electronic Transaction, SET [33], is a
more advanced standard for credit card based
payments. One of its core features is that mer-
chants only see encrypted credit card numbers,
which can only be decrypted by the issuers. More-
over, the number is cryptographically bound to
the transaction by a digital signature. This sys-
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tem is conceptually much better, but until now it
has not become popular due to its complexity.
Recently, Visa published the specifications
of its 3-D Secure Authenticated Payment Pro-
gram [37]. This system is mainly based on
SSL/TLS. Its purpose is to authenticate card-
holders in order to reduce the number of disputed
on-line transactions.
American Express offers a ‘one-time credit
card’ solution [1] with which customers can pro-
tect their privacy, but which also solves some
of the above mentioned problems. Alternatively,
several similar systems exist (e.g., InternetCash
[18]) in which customers can obtain some pre-paid
value identified and protected with a number and
PIN, and use it on-line in cooperation with a cen-
tral server. Finally, real-life electronic payment
means (e.g., Proton [29] and debit cards) are also
starting to be deployed on the WWW (e.g., [2]).
3 Wireless security
GSM and WAP are currently probably the two
most popular and widely used wireless technolo-
gies. They are briefly presented in the following
paragraphs. Thereafter, some other systems and
initiatives in the wireless world are discussed.
3.1 GSM
GSM, Global System for Mobile communica-
tions, is the currently very popular digital cel-
lular telecommunications system specified by the
European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI). In short, GSM intends to provide
three security services [36]: temporary identities,
for the confidentiality of the user identity; entity
authentication, that is, to verify the identity of
the user; and encryption, for the confidentiality
of user-related data (note that data can be con-
tained in a traffic channel, e.g., voice, or signaling
channel, e.g., SMS messages).
The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) is a se-
curity device, a smart card which contains all the
necessary information and algorithms to authen-
ticate the subscriber to the network. It is a re-
movable module and may be used in any mobile
equipment [36]. Note that the encryption algo-
rithms are integrated into the mobile equipment
as dedicated hardware. GSM does not use public-
key cryptography. Symmetric keys are derived
from user related data using an algorithm under
the control of a master key.
The electronic payment system described in the
example later in this paper, requires the SIM to
contain a small payment application, based on the
SIM Application Toolkit. The SIM Application
Toolkit [14] provides mechanisms which allow ap-
plications, existing in the SIM, to interact and
operate with any compliant mobile equipment.
These mechanisms include displaying text from
the SIM to the mobile phone, sending and receiv-
ing SMS messages, and initiating a dialogue with
the user. In addition to the GSM security mech-
anisms, special SIM Application Toolkit security
features have been defined [12, 13]. The secu-
rity requirements that have been considered are:
(entity) authentication, message integrity, replay
detection and sequence integrity, proof of receipt
and proof of execution, message confidentiality,
and indication of the security mechanisms used.
According to the standard, digital signatures can
be used to implement some of these requirements.
Note that the same distinction between com-
munications security and application security as
made in the WWW security context, can be made
here: standard GSM security at the communica-
tions level, and SIM Application Toolkit security
at the application level.
3.2 WAP
The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is a
protocol stack for wireless communication net-
works. WAP is bearer independent; the most
common bearer is currently GSM.
Similar to SSL/TLS for the Internet,
WTLS [44] is WAP’s communications secu-
rity solution. It also relies on a Public Key
Infrastructure [40, 39]. The main differences
are that WTLS supports by default algorithms
based on elliptic-curve cryptography, is adapted
for datagram communication (instead of connec-
tion), and supports its own certificate format,
besides X.509v3, optimized for size. TLS was
as such modified to make it more suitable in
an environment where there are bandwidth,
memory, and processing limitations.
At the application layer, WAP provides digital
signature functionality through the WMLScript
Crypto Library [45], which is similar to Netscape’s
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Javascript signing. Comparable to the GSM’s
SIM, WAP devices will use a Wireless Identity
Module (WIM) [43] which can contain the nec-
essary private and public keys to perform digital
signatures and certificate verification respectively.
3.3 Other systems and inititiatives
GSM is a second-generation system (2G).
UMTS, Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System [35], is part of a global family of third-
generation (3G) mobile communications systems.
These systems provide high-capacity and more se-
cure [38] communication. A competitor of WAP
is NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode [27]. Bluetooth [5] is a
wireless protocol for communication between de-
vices that are in close proximity. The Internet
itself is also expanding to the wireless world. The
IETF is currently defining standards for Mobile
IP [17], and is working on extensions (including
wireless) for TLS [4].
The Mobile Electronic Signature Consortium
has defined mSign [24], which should provide a
standardized interface between Primary Service
Providers (e.g., merchants) and Mobile Opera-
tors. It allows Primary Service Providers to re-
quest signatures from end-users through the Mo-
bile Operators. The Mobile electronic Transac-
tions initiative – MeT [25] – intends to establish
a consistent and coherent framework for secure
mobile transactions, based on existing standards
and specifications; where needed, new functional-
ity will be submitted to relevant standardization
and specification organizations. There are numer-
ous other fora concerned with mobile secure pay-
ments, see [7] for a description and comparison of
these.
4 Combining WWW and
wireless
Both the World Wide Web and the wireless world
on their own have security and/or functionality
problems. These shortcomings are explained in
the following paragraphs. An approach in which
the two worlds and their advantages are com-
bined, is then motivated.
4.1 WWW: problems
It is very common that only web servers have cer-
tificates with which they are authenticated. In
case user authentication is needed, it is almost
never done via SSL/TLS client authentication.
Users are often authenticated via their IP address,
which is vulnerable to IP spoofing [3], which cer-
tainly does not provide mobility, and which is just
not usable in an open system. Fixed passwords
are frequently used, which provide mobility, but
which are vulnerable to guessing, dictionary at-
tacks and social engineering [26]. Passwords that
are only used once [21] are not frequently used.
They would be more secure, but certainly less
convenient.
Root certificates are needed when verifying a
web server certificate. It is very important that
a user has an authentic copy of these certificates.
This is more or less ensured by shipping them to-
gether with the browsers. It is however easy to
add more or even replace root certificates. More-
over, the browser trust model causes a server cer-
tificate to be trusted if it is successfully verified
by any of the root certificates (since there is usu-
ally no central policy management, this might eas-
ily include an attacker’s root certificate). Finally,
browsers generally also do not yet check by de-
fault if a certificate has been revoked.
Users must recognize when they have a secure
session with a web server. However, in todays
browsers, there are only some limited visual indi-
cations (e.g., closed lock), and an unexperienced
user is easily fooled by a spoofed web site as
demonstrated by Felten et al. [15] and more re-
cently by Yuan et al. [46].
If the user has a public/private key pair – for
SSL/TLS client authentication, for SET, or for
digitally signing documents – the private key will
mostly reside on the hard disk of the machine.
Even if it is protected by a pass phrase, it is
still very vulnerable, for example due to Trojan
horses. Users with such a software token are also
hardly mobile. Smart cards are a solution, but
for particular applications, they might be inconve-
nient. Moreover, smart card readers are currently
not installed on each machine. Other special-
purpose hardware, such as a Digipass [10], as
sometimes used in e-banking, might be too costly
for small applications, i.e., the investment for the
customers and/or merchants would just be too
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high compared to the expected benefits.
Current end-user computing systems tend to of-
fer more functionality at the cost of security. This
is actually the reason why for example root certifi-
cates and private keys are so vulnerable on current
end-user machines. Specifically, there is currently
a lack of secure operating systems [22] and trusted
components [34]. Today’s PC and browser offer
advanced functionality, but are (therefore) an in-
secure environment.
4.2 Wireless: problems
While the security problems on the WWW are
currently more related to the secure management
of the end-points, the security problems in some
wireless systems are still with the protocols and
algorithms themselves. For example, algorithms
used by many GSM providers have been bro-
ken and ‘over-the-air cloning’ and real-time eaves-
dropping have been shown (at least in theory) to
be feasible [32]. Security problems have been dis-
covered in other mobile systems too [6, 19]. Most
of these problems are due to non-public design
of the algorithms and protocols, leakage and/or
publication of the details to the general public
afterwards, and discovery of flaws by the crypto-
graphic community.
More conceptually, both GSM and WAP do not
offer end-to-end security. GSM security only ap-
plies on the wireless link, i.e., from mobile phone
to base station, but not from mobile phone to
mobile phone. The fixed network is considered
to be secure (more precisely, GSM intends to of-
fer the same security level as the fixed network).
In the WAP architecture, WAP devices commu-
nicate with web servers through a WAP gateway.
WTLS is only used between the device and the
gateway, while SSL/TLS can be used between the
gateway and the server. From a security point
of view, this means that the gateway should be
considered as a person-in-the-middle. Note that
WAP is now evolving into end-to-end security
[42, 41].
Security seems to evolve in the good direction
though. From a usability point of view on the
other hand, mobile devices have still a rather lim-
ited functionality. They are not performant, and
have often a quite poor human-device interface.
Although mobile devices are getting more ad-
vanced, they will always be outsmarted by desk-
top PCs. Note that the complexity of the PC
(e.g., multi-user operating system, data with exe-
cutable content, ...) is the main reason why secur-
ing the end-points of the communication is such
a difficult task, and remains an important prob-
lem on the WWW. As long as mobile devices
stay quite simple and do not provide too much
functionality, their security as an end-point will
be more easy to cope with.
4.3 Motivation for a combined
approach
By combining the World Wide Web with a wire-
less system, we want to come to practical and
low-cost electronic commerce applications, which
can fully exploit the broad functionality of the
WWW. Two goals should hereby be achieved at
the same time: security and mobility.
The WWW on its own does not seem to be suf-
ficient for these applications. It surely provides
broad functionality. When for example only fixed
passwords are used, the WWW also offers mobil-
ity, i.e., a user can initiate transactions from any
computer (e.g., a public terminal). Strong secu-
rity is in that case however not achieved. Stronger
security can be achieved by using for example
cryptographic keys stored on the computer’s hard
disk. However, this does not allow for practical
mobility. Special-purpose hardware tokens would
increase the security of the application and pro-
vide mobility again. However, in an electronic
commerce environment, consumers do not likely
want to pay for a token that can only be used in
the context of that application.
Wireless systems on their own are not suit-
able either. By definition, they offer mobility.
Although there are some weaknesses in current
systems, security in wireless systems tends to
improve substantially. It is however clear that
the GSM system is a rather limited environment.
WAP offers a more general and WWW-like func-
tionality, but in practice today’s devices and net-
works do not satisfy the needs of merchants and
customers. Mobile devices are generally expected
to stay inferior to desktop computers.
This brings us to the motivation for a combined
approach. Mobile devices are general-purpose de-
vices which can be used as an extension to the
WWW – instead of special-purpose devices – to
offer more security and mobility without any ex-
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tra cost. These mobile devices can be person-
alized and can store secret information such as
cryptographic keys. They can be used in combi-
nation with any computer, i.e., the personal com-
puter at the user’s home, but also a public ter-
minal, hereby providing mobility. Moreover, the
computer terminal must not necessarily be com-
pletely trusted, as (part of) the security will rely
on trusted and/or secret information that is se-
curely stored in the device (and never leaves it, in
case of secrecy).
In the remainder of this paper, this combined
approach will be illustrated with an electronic
payment system for the WWW that makes use
of a mobile phone. This GSM based system is an
alternative to the widely spread credit card based
solution, offering more security and equivalent
mobility and complexity (assuming that a mobile
phone is standard equipment of many users). In
addition, it might be suited for lower-price trans-
actions.
5 GSM based payment for the
WWW
The main goal of the remaining part of the paper
is to present a system in which the WWW and
GSM environment are combined to improve over-
all security, mobility, and functionality. In partic-
ular, an architecture and protocol are developed
in which: (1) a customer can initiate and com-
plete an electronic payment over the GSM net-
work where the network operator is an active par-
ticipant; (2) the pre-payment related interaction
is done via the WWW; (3) the customer receives
a receipt with which he/she can pick up the goods
(post-payment).
5.1 Involved entities
The following entities play an active role in this
e-commerce system:
Customer The Customer wants to buy some-
thing via the WWW. Payment will be done via
his/her GSM. The Customer will receive a receipt,
with which he/she can pick up the goods (the sys-
tem must work with both physically deliverable
goods and electronically available goods). Obvi-
ously, the Customer should have a PC with In-
ternet connection. This can also be a public ter-
minal. He/she needs a mobile phone with SIM
Application Toolkit functionality. The SIM card
should be issued by a Network Operator that is
running this electronic payment service. Option-
ally, there should be a connection between the
mobile phone and the PC, and accordingly some
extra software on the PC.
Merchant The Merchant wants to sell some-
thing via the WWW. He/she should have a web
server, and an access point to the mobile network.
Examples are an on-line bookstore, a pizza deliv-
ery chain, an electronic parts shop, etc.
Deliverer The Deliverer is the local (with re-
spect to the Customer) representative of the Mer-
chant. It will deliver the goods after having ver-
ified the receipt the Customer has obtained from
the Merchant. The Deliverer should have some
equipment to verify this receipt. An example is
the pizza delivery boy/girl, etc. The Deliverer can
also be another company that made an agreement
with the Merchant. For example, the Merchant
can send the goods to a gas station near the Cus-
tomer; in this case, the gas station is the Deliverer
where the Customer can pick up the goods.
Network Operator The N.O. plays the role
of the bank. It will deduct the necessary amount
of money from the Customer’s balance (can
be credit or pre-payment based), and add this
amount to the Merchant’s balance. A commission
on this amount will be taken, or a periodical
fee will be requested from the Customer and/or
Merchant. In practice there will be multiple
N.O.s: N.O.(C), N.O.(M) and N.O.(D), for
the Customer, the Merchant and the Deliverer
respectively (as shown in Fig. 1).
Note that in reality, and from a non-technical
point of view, it might not be easy for any Net-
work Operator to deploy an electronic payment
service (e.g., banking license). Alternatively, the
“Network Operator” could in this system be re-
placed by a real financial institution, which makes
an agreement with one or more operators.
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5.2 Architecture and protocol
From a high-level point of view, the different enti-
ties perform the following interactions (see Fig. 1):
after browsing and negotiating, the Customer re-
quests a purchase; via an SMS message, the Mer-
chant asks the Customer to pay the purchase; the
Customer pays by sending an SMS message to the
Network Operator; the Network Operator informs
the Merchant about the successful payment; the
Merchant sends a receipt to the Customer (also an
SMS message); the Customer can use this receipt
to pick up the goods at the Deliverer.
The protocol contains the following steps (see
Fig. 1):
1. Purchase Request After browsing and ne-
gotiating (0), the Customer makes a Purchase
Request via the WWW (1). The Merchant can
choose the format and encoding of the message. It
should at least contain a description of the goods,
the amount of money to be paid, and the Cus-
tomer’s GSM number (in order to be able to send
an SMS message to the Customer). The mes-
sage will normally be sent through submission
of an HTML form. The level of protection can
be chosen by the Merchant, but it will normally
be protected in transit by SSL/TLS. The form
could also be digitally signed by the Customer
(e.g., Netscape’s Javascript signing capability, or
Signed XML).
2. Purchase Confirm The Merchant sends a
Purchase Confirm via SMS (2) to the Customer’s
mobile phone. This message should be in a stan-
dard format, and is optionally digitally signed by
the Merchant. The message contains: (option-
ally) a description of the goods (either a hashed
form of the description, or an abbreviated yet
unique description of the goods, e.g., as in su-
permarket receipts), a Transaction ID (TID), a
unique Merchant ID, the ID of N.O.(M), and the
amount of money to be paid. The Merchant also
sends a Purchase Confirm via the WWW (2).
Note that this could already be included in the
reply to the submission of the Purchase Request
form.
3. Verification by the Customer The Cus-
tomer verifies whether all the ordered goods are
listed, and whether the amount of money re-
quested equals the amount agreed on. The infor-
mation in the SMS message should be the same
as the information displayed in the browser. Au-
thentication of the Merchant thus relies on both
GSM (we assume that the Customer knows the
number of the Merchant) and SSL/TLS, so the
Customer’s trust in the correct execution of the
transaction increases. If the reply in the browser
and/or the SMS message are digitally signed, the
signatures are verified. Note that in current GSM
phones such a signature must possibly be verified
using additional software on the computer. This
requires a connection between the mobile phone
and the PC which can for example be provided by
Bluetooth. An automatic verification and com-
parison of the reply in the browser and the SMS
message can then also be made. The interface
to the Customer is provided by the SIM Applica-
tion Toolkit. A payment application is installed
on the SIM card, which is invoked on receipt of a
Purchase Confirm message.
4. Debit Account The SIM Application
Toolkit application asks the Customer a confir-
mation for sending a Debit Account message (4)
to the N.O.(C). This message includes the amount
of money to be paid, the TID, the Merchant’s ID
and N.O.(M)’s ID. The authentication of the Cus-
tomer relies on GSM entity authentication (the
Customer’s mobile phone number should be in
the Merchant’s database). The TID will allow
verification by the Merchant afterwards.
5. Inter-N.O The N.O.(C) deducts the proper
amount of money from the Customer’s balance,
and forwards the Debit Account message to
N.O.(M). The N.O.(M) adds the amount to the
Merchant’s account.
6. Delivery OK The N.O.(M) sends a Delivery
OK (6) to the Merchant. This message contains
the amount of money and the TID, and can be
digitally signed by the N.O.(M).
7. Verification by the Merchant The Mer-
chant verifies if the Delivery OK message origi-
nates from the N.O.(M) (relying on GSM entity
authentication). If added, the digital signature of
the N.O.(M) is verified. The Merchant looks up
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4. Debit Account 10. Verification by Deliverer
5. Inter-N.O. 11. Delivery of Goods
6. Delivery OK 12. Confirmation of Reception
Figure 1: GSM based payment for the WWW: architecture and protocol
the TID in his transaction database, and checks
if the amount of money is the same as included in
the corresponding Purchase Confirm messages.
8. Receipt The Merchant sends a Receipt (8)
to the Customer via SMS. It contains: a (hashed)
description of the goods, the TID, a timestamp
(in order for the Deliverer to verify the freshness
of the receipt), information on the Deliverer (op-
tionally depending on the Customer’s cell loca-
tion, and including the Deliverer’s GSM number),
and information on the Customer (optionally in-
cluding its GSM number, to allow verification of
ownership of the receipt). The receipt is digitally
signed by the Merchant. The receipt can only
be used for the intended Deliverer as indicated.
The TID and timestamp ensure that the receipt
cannot be replayed by the Customer (i.e., the De-
liverer should keep a list of previously received
TIDs and should not accept receipts that are too
old). GSM authentication is relied upon for au-
thenticating the Customer.
9. Presentation of the receipt If goods are
electronic and delivered via the WWW, a receipt
is not needed. Goods are then downloaded us-
ing the TID. The Merchant keeps a list of which
TIDs correspond to transactions for which a pay-
ment has been received. Physical goods should
be retrieved at the Deliverer. The receipt is for-
warded to the Deliverer (9), manually or through
the SIM Application Toolkit, or the Customer
just presents the receipt to the Deliverer on the
screen of his/her own GSM.
10. Verification by the Deliverer The Deliv-
erer just reads the receipt from the screen of the
Customer’s or his/her own GSM, or he/she veri-
fies the receipt more properly by checking if the
signature of the Merchant is valid. The Deliverer
needs some infrastructure with GSM access point
for this (e.g., a GSM connected to a laptop).
11. Delivery of goods If the receipt is valid,
the Deliverer can be sure that the Customer is
the one that has made (and paid) the purchase.
The goods can thus be delivered (11). In case of
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electronic goods which are delivered directly by
the Merchant’s web site (not necessarily though,
as the Deliverer might have its own web site), the
Customer should be granted access based on the
TID: after a Delivery OK message has been re-
ceived, the Merchant enables the access to the in-
formation; the TID should not be known to other
entities (however, note that the N.O. should be
trusted not to misuse its knowledge of the TID).
12. Confirmation of reception After the
Customer has obtained the goods, it can option-
ally be required that he/she confirms the recep-
tion of the goods (12), e.g., by digitally signing
a specific message. This will prevent Customers
from denying later on having received the goods.
6 Analysis and remarks
The proposed GSM based electronic payment sys-
tem for the WWW is analyzed further in this sec-
tion. Some GSM specific comments are given,
the security and privacy of the system is evalu-
ated, and a comparison with a number of similar
systems is made. Note that this section only in-
tends to discuss this particular example, and not
the general combined approach.
Only the essential steps of the proposed pay-
ment system are presented in this paper. It is
clear that a real implementation of this system
would require many extra features. For exam-
ple, it is possible that the Customer completed
the payment but did not receive a receipt. Other
kinds of interrupted transactions might occur. To
be able to cope with this, status and cancel re-
quests should be built into the system.
6.1 GSM functionality
The protocol relies on SMS messages. These
can only contain 160 characters, which should be
taken into account when defining the exact con-
tent of the protocol messages. Note that GSM
provides a mechanism to send long messages as
a concatenation of multiple SMS messages. Since
the protocol involves on-line bi-directional com-
munication between the entities, there should be
not much latency between sending and receiving
SMS messages. This might be a problem in the
case of international roaming.
The proposed system relies on GSM authenti-
cation. The participants can only verify the iden-
tity of their communication peers though if “caller
identification” is supported by the mobile network
and the phone, and if it is not disabled.
6.2 Security
The security features of SSL/TLS and GSM form
together a basis for the security of the proposed
electronic payment system. By having a close link
between the two, the security is even improved.
The Customer can securely request a purchase
via SSL/TLS. The Customer will receive a con-
firmation via this same secure channel, and also
on its mobile phone. Therefore, the Customer
can double-check the Merchant’s identity, and the
contents of the purchase, including the amount of
money to be paid.
The Merchant can rely on the GSM network to
be sure to receive an authenticated payment from
the Customer via the Network Operator later on.
Moreover, the Customer cannot cheat by request-
ing its Network Operator to deduct a smaller
amount of money than originally requested by
the Merchant. The Merchant would notice the
smaller amount of money and not send a receipt.
The Deliverer can validate a receipt by veri-
fying the digital signature of the Merchant, and
by checking if the receipt is fresh. Thus, receipts
cannot be forged, and cannot be replayed. More-
over, if the Customer’s mobile phone number is
included in the receipt, the Deliverer could rely
on GSM authentication and check if the receipt
is actually presented by the original initiator of
the transaction (note that for some applications,
Customers might desire to be able to forward the
receipt to another party that in its turn can pick
up the goods).
As on top of SSL/TLS and GSM, some crucial
messages are digitally signed; this decreases the
need for Customers and Merchants to trust each
other (i.e., they only need to trust they use the
right public key, which should be ensured by the
certificates that are issued by mutually trusted
CAs). For example, since the receipt is digitally
signed, it cannot only be verified by the Deliv-
erer, but also by a Judge, in case of a dispute.
Note that the latter also requires that the receipt
includes a unique and indisputable description of
the goods that should be delivered.
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The Network Operator is trusted to transfer the
proper amount of money from the Customer’s to
the Merchant’s balance. It is expected to do so,
as its business would otherwise quickly collapse
due to negative publicity.
In some sense, the Customer’s mobile phone
can be considered as a secure and personal de-
vice (and care should therefore be taken that it
is not easily stolen or lost). The strength of the
electronic payment system proposed in this ex-
ample relies particularly on the security of such a
device, which is combined with the advanced yet
insecure environment provided by the PC and the
browser.
6.3 Privacy
The presented electronic payment system seems
to offer more security than today’s widely used
mechanisms; however, it does not really offer more
privacy. Merchants know at least the mobile
phone number of their Customers. This num-
ber does not necessarily reveal a Customer’s real
identity (as opposed to an ordinary credit card
payment). There already exist phone books with
GSM numbers though. One would for example
certainly not be happy when this number would
be used for advertisement purposes. In fact, for
this reason, some people will be reluctant to re-
lease their phone number, while they freely dis-
close their credit card number to merchants. The
ability of hiding numbers or anonymizing cus-
tomers in another way, would thus be an improve-
ment of the system. Just as with credit card
payments, the Network Operator knows exactly
which Customers are buying goods from which
Merchants and for what amount of money. The
Network Operator will not necessarily know the
actual nature of the goods though.
6.4 Other approaches
Numerous other GSM based payment systems ex-
ist. GiSMo [16] is (was) a system intended for
the Internet in which customers receive a random
code through SMS via a central server. This ran-
dom code is then entered via the computer in or-
der to pay. Mint [23] is a system in which each
terminal/shop has a unique phone number which
the customer should just call at the time of pay-
ment. Similar alternatives are Jalda [20] and Pay-
box [28].
In the system presented in this paper, more
payment related information is exchanged via
GSM, which results in a closer link between the
WWW and the GSM interaction. Conceptually,
it is also more general and independent of the
wireless system. With more advanced mobile de-
vices and networks, such as UMTS, more secure
schemes would be possible, following the same ar-
chitecture and protocol, but with different con-
tent of (and another exchange mechanism of) the
messages. For example, instead of an account
based protocol, electronic cash like schemes could
be used. Mobile devices with built-in smart card
readers would be very useful for integrating smart
card based payment means as used in the physical
world.
7 Conclusion
Electronic commerce is already a normal part of
people’s ordinary life. Mobile devices, and cer-
tainly mobile phones, are currently widely spread.
This paper gave a brief overview of the security
properties of the World Wide Web and some ex-
isting mobile systems. The main purpose of this
paper was to suggest to use a wireless system as an
extension to the WWW, to provide more security
and functionality. To demonstrate this combined
approach, a GSM based electronic payment for
the WWW was presented.
Unlike most mobile phones, some mobile de-
vices are powerful and advanced enough to allow
more or less convenient browsing and shopping.
Future mobile systems will also be more secure
and will offer more functionality than the GSM
system or than WAP. Yet, the concept of using an
out-of-band channel for electronic payment, and
the combined use of a mobile device together with
a normal PC, will remain very useful. For the
PC and its big screen will always be far more ad-
vanced than the mobile device, but will never be
mobile.
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